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Abstract 
This article argues for the need to think about the politics of regret more critically, within 
academia and beyond. The politics of regret here refers to the process through which the 
representation of past events comes to be dominated by apologetic voices in the public 
discourse. A brief overview of the most prominent previous attempts to make sense of the 
phenomenon shows why it is vital to strengthen the critical perspective to the issue. I assume 
that, in practice, the politics of regret almost always makes use of simplified representations 
of historical events that constitute images of the self and of wider society; as such, it should 
be properly understood as mythical. For this reason, I argue that the critical (scholarly and 
social) approach to the politics of regret should be based on a more general ethical framework 
to myths that simultaneously acknowledges the right to existence of all interpretations of the 
past (including political regret) and challenges the exclusionary characteristics of 
mythologies. 
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Our times are sometimes described as a ‘mnemonic age’,1 an ‘age of apology’,2 an ‘age of 
shattered time’.3 For good or ill, the ‘cultural obsession’ with memory4 has indeed become a 
factor to count with in several societies and memory studies is considered by many as an 
emerging academic field in its own right.
5
 Particular attention has been paid to how wrongs 
committed in the past are commemorated. Among others, official apologies, remembrance 
days, reparations to victims and memorials have become widely used policy measures, often 
presented as attempts to ‘come to terms’ with the traumatic experience of mass crimes 
committed in the past. 
This phenomenon, termed the ‘politics of regret’ by Jeffrey Olick,6 has attracted the 
attention of many scholars in recent years from a wide array of disciplines. Several works 
have explored this trend from a variety of angles: the moral necessity of remembering (or of 
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forgetting) past wrongs,
7
 the desirability or undesirability of the politics of regret in the light 
of its social implications,
8
 the meaning and genuineness of apology,
9
 its psychological 
assessment,
10
 etc. The aim of this article is to outline the framework of a critical engagement 
with the politics of regret. After dealing with some fundamental conceptual issues, I present a 
critique of the most prominent previous approaches to this phenomenon (namely the 
transitology, the historical sociology and the moral philosophy approaches). Building on 
these observations, I attempt to explain the possibility and the importance of thinking about 
the politics of regret more critically, within academia and beyond. I assume that many 
(indeed most) instances of the politics of regret should be properly understood as mythical; 
therefore, many conceptual and analytical considerations developed in the literature on 
political mythologies are relevant to its study. Drawing on different scholarly attitudes to 
myths, I discuss what a critical scholarly engagement with the politics of regret can be. 
Critical scholarship is understood in this article in a broad sense. It is certainly inspired by 
the Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School but it does not necessarily accept its 
Marxist underpinnings. It is useful to think about the critical approach that I am about to 
develop in terms of Robert Cox’s distinction between problem-solving and critical thinking. 
Problem-solving thinking, which I believe most of the previous approaches to the politics of 
regret follow, considers the importance of solving the problem at hand almost self-evident. It 
‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the 
institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’.11 In contrast, I 
propose a more critical scholarly attitude which problematizes the very social and political 
framework within which the questions asked by this problem-solving approach emerged as 
important and challenges the taken-for-granted assumptions upon which these questions are 
based. Critical thinking with respect to the politics of regret is not (and should not be) 
restricted to academia, of course. In practice, a critical attitude to political regret is part of a 
more general critical stance towards mythologies and mythical thinking that will be explained 
in detail in the last section of this article. 
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The Politics of Regret as a Myth 
The term ‘politics of regret’ originally meant ‘a variety of practices with which many 
contemporary societies confront toxic legacies of the past’ in Olick’s understanding.12 I have 
the impression that even he did not use the term consistently as in his writings it sometimes 
referred to all the institutions of transitional justice, sometimes only to state apology, and at 
other times to the ‘memory boom’ in general. For the purposes of this article, it is understood 
more narrowly as the process through which the representation of certain problematic past 
events comes to be dominated by apologetic voices which usually acknowledge the role of 
the state or of wider society in certain atrocities and thus take some degree of responsibility 
for them. Many approaches to past events do not express regret but instead rely on other 
strategies, such as denial or silence. Naturally, no single approach can completely dominate 
the discursive space about a part of the past in a society. This means that the politics of regret 
may be stronger and weaker in certain countries, has stronger and weaker forms, and always 
exists alongside and in contestation with non-regretful coping strategies. The case which 
illustrates this point well is Germany and its Vergangenheitsbewältigung (working through 
the past) with respect to the Holocaust. A strong form of political regret has certainly been 
the dominant approach for some time, but its rise to prominence was a long and painful 
process; it was and still is challenged by weaker forms of political regret and by other coping 
strategies.
13
 
My argument in this article rests on the assumption that instances of the politics of regret 
rely upon strong mythical stories of guilt. Myth, in this sense, needs to be carefully 
differentiated from the way it is used in everyday conversation (where it is usually 
understood to stand for a false belief, an untrue story), and also from the way it is often 
employed in anthropological accounts (where it refers to uncontested and incontestable 
narratives that ground the origins of a community). Following Duncan Bell, I understand 
myths to be ‘highly simplified narratives ascribing fixed and coherent meanings to selected 
events, people, and places, real or imaginary. They are easily intelligible, transmissible, and 
help constitute or bolster particular visions of self, society, and world’.14 
Myths have been important for creating and sustaining nations, national communities and 
national identities. These representational practices traditionally rely on simple stories about 
golden ages, heroic acts and immeasurable suffering and sacrifice. The end of the nineteenth 
century, when monuments and celebrations aimed at strengthening nationalist feelings 
mushroomed throughout Europe, is often thought about as the first wave of the ‘memory 
boom’. For example, Bastille Day became a national holiday only in 1880, almost a century 
after the actual event. According to the mainstream narrative within memory studies, the 
second memory boom originated in the US in the 1980s and supposedly reached its peak in 
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the mid-1990s.
15
 Olick suggested that the recent wave of state apologies for crimes that they 
have committed in the past heralds the arrival of a new form of self-legitimation, the politics 
of regret, which relies on the feeling of guilt, on the demand for regret, and on the exposition 
of shameful events instead of the glorification of the national past. While I do not agree with 
Olick’s claim that the rise of apologetic discourses is necessarily the consequence of the 
decline of the nation state and of nationalist sentiments, I build on his two important 
observations: political regret is a novel form of self-legitimation and identification, and 
historical narratives of guilt play a vital role in its development and perpetuation. If we accept 
these empirical claims, it is easy to see why the politics of regret falls under the definition of 
myth given by Bell. I would even add that, as most myths, instances of political regret aspire 
to completely dominate the discursive space about the past events to which they refer. In 
order to achieve discursive domination and to be effective at constituting identities, they need 
to present themselves as the only true and legitimate narratives about the events in question. 
Is it even theoretically possible to conceive of a non-mythical politics of regret? For this, a 
hypothetical case of political regret should have none of the properties that are attributed to 
myths. As it makes references to past events, the politics of regret does need to use historical 
narratives, similarly to myths. Unlike the ones underlying myths, however, the narratives of 
political regret can in principle be complex and aware of the fragility of historical truth 
claims. Presumably, such stories, difficult to understand and self-reflective about their own 
historical foundations, would also be less effective at promoting visions of the self and of the 
world to a huge number of people. For analytical purposes, we may think about this as the 
ideal type of the non-mythical politics of regret. Therefore, instead of asking whether 
instances of political regret are mythical or not, it makes more sense to ask to what extent 
actual cases of the politics of regret are mythical. It is useful to imagine a continuum between 
the ideal types of mythical and non-mythical politics of regret; real world cases may 
approximate these ideal types but are always somewhere in-between the two extremes. In this 
article, I build on Olick’s empirical observations and assume that real world cases of political 
regret are currently close to the mythical side of the spectrum. 
Some might be surprised (or even outraged) about the way this article assumes that, in 
practice, apologetic speech acts have strong mythical elements. It must be noted, however, 
that the concept of myth is defined in this essay in a way that does not imply anything about 
the historical accuracy of the claims underlying these commemorative acts. Even so, some 
might find the concept of myth confusing and would opt for terms that are less associated 
with falsity in everyday conversation. The problem is that the alternatives are not very 
appealing. Using the simple word ‘narrative’ would fail to capture an important quality of 
myths: the attempt to present a simplified reading of a complex historical event or process 
which in turn allows myths to effectively popularise representations of the self and of the 
wider community. The term ‘discourse’ is too broad; a myth is certainly a type of discourse 
or a ‘truth regime’, but not all discourses are identity-constitutive historical narratives. The 
usefulness of the concept of memory is also questionable. Even if many regard myth an ‘old-
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fashioned concept’16 and an ‘older term’,17 it still seems to be more precise than the 
misleading metaphor of memory. Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam called the concept of memory 
‘an act of intrusion ... jostling aside older yet still effective working terms, and unavoidably 
obliterating fine distinctions’.18 Similarly, Henry Rousso noted that ‘the concept of memory 
has been extensively interpreted to the extent that it now seems to define any kind of link 
between past and present’.19 To be fair, recent formulations of the concept of collective 
memory are more careful; Astrid Erll even argued that a third, more theoretically and 
methodologically conscious, wave in memory studies is in the making.
20
 Consider Jan 
Assmann’s distinction between communicative and cultural memory,21 Richard Ned Lebow’s 
terms of collective and institutional memory,
22
 Olick’s thoughts on collected and collective 
memory,
23
 or the idea of entangled memory presented by Gregor Feindt et al.
24
 Even so, 
societies and groups are still ‘said to remember, to forget, and to repress the past ... such 
language is at best metaphorical and at worst misleading about the phenomenon under 
study’.25 
Without trying to intervene in this conceptual debate, this article follows Bell in 
distinguishing between memory and myth. Memory is understood narrowly to refer to ‘the 
socially-framed property of individual minds … an individualistic psychological 
phenomenon in so far as it is a phenomenon that only individuals can possess properly’.26 
Shared representations of past events, however, ‘should not be regarded as truly mnemonic. 
Instead, they should be conceived of as mythical’.27 Free from the weight of terms such as 
collective memory and national memory, it is easier to acknowledge that there is never a 
single, unconditionally accepted historical narrative in any society. The governing myth 
always ‘coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths’.28 The ‘totality of 
myths within any given collective’ is the mythscape, ‘the discursive space in which the 
various myths of the collective are forged and challenged’.29 The aim of this section was to 
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demonstrate why it makes sense to say that the politics of regret should be regarded as part of 
the mythscape. 
The Literature on the Politics of Regret 
In this section, I will outline the most important strands of literature that have attempted to 
address questions related to the politics of regret. By highlighting what I perceive to be the 
most acute limitations of these frameworks and why I consider them inadequate for studying 
the phenomenon at hand, I aim to demonstrate that new, more critical approaches to the 
politics of regret are necessary. Olick criticised the comparative and the moral philosophy 
approaches, the two dominant analytical frameworks for studying the politics of regret, and 
encouraged a historical sociological approach to the phenomenon. I mostly agree with 
Olick’s critique but I also find that all three frameworks lack the critical edge that this article 
aims to strengthen. In the following, I will address each of these approaches in turn. 
The Comparative Approach 
Most of the empirical study of the politics of regret has taken place in the field of 
transitology, where state apology for a certain past wrong is considered to be ‘an institution 
of transitional justice’. This approach usually concentrates on comparing a variety of 
transitional experiences in order to determine what factors influenced the different ‘mix’ of 
transitional justice mechanisms pursued by different countries and what choices were most 
effective in consolidating the emerging democratic order. While admitting that these research 
questions are crucially important, Olick criticised this approach for the methods it usually 
employs to answer them. Most of the relevant works in transitology compare regime changes 
from very different times taking place in very different countries and believe that an infallible 
recipe to enhance the accuracy of the analysis is to consider as many cases as possible. In its 
quest for a general model of transition, this literature’s ‘“variables” approach removed much 
of the context from the analysis, erasing the peculiarities of specific cases … virtually any 
case is a grist in the analytical mill’.30 To support this claim, Olick only mentioned works 
from the early years of transitology,
31
 but I believe that recent developments in the literature 
all but confirm these claims. The most notable initiative in this vein is the Transitional Justice 
Data Base Project in which over 900 transitional justice experiences are compiled with the 
aim of rendering their statistical analysis more meaningful with this large sample.
32
 The 
politics of regret can only be studied on such a scale at a very high level of abstraction or 
with significant conceptual stretching; thus I agree with Olick that this ‘scientific’ approach is 
inappropriate for understanding a process that seems to be deeply rooted in social relations 
and historical experiences. 
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While Olick attacks existing explanations primarily on the grounds that their use of 
mainstream quantitative methods is unsuitable for studying the politics of regret, I also 
question whether the underlying theoretical framework of transitology is appropriate for the 
analysis of this research problem. First, the cornerstone of this literature, the emphasis on the 
model of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, seems problematic in this research 
context. The politics of regret can emerge with or without regime change.
33
 The crimes that 
may be candidates for commemoration were not necessarily committed in an authoritarian 
system.
34
 A democratic political system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
the emergence of the politics of regret. Furthermore, by viewing democratisation simply as 
the introduction of a set of rules, institutions and norms, this approach takes for granted a 
process that is a result of historical contingencies and disregards the various ways it rests on 
the creation of meanings. Finally, by using a conception of the politics of regret as a form of 
historical justice, transitology focuses almost exclusively on policy decisions while it misses 
the essential representational and discursive aspects of the problem. Although state apologies 
are important and tend to have a high influence on the wider discourse about certain historical 
events, the emphasis should not be on these policy decisions and their enactment but on the 
way the problematic period of the past has been represented through them and through other 
means. Contrary to many previous transitology essays on the topic, the discursive aspects of 
the politics of regret should be at the centre of the critical analysis. 
The Historical Sociological Approach 
Theorising about why the politics of regret has recently become so prevalent is not limited to 
the empirical analyses of transitology. A number of explanations has emerged which place 
this phenomenon in grander historical sociological narratives. As mentioned earlier, Olick’s 
theory is that we are undergoing a profound memory crisis similar to the one that occurred at 
the end of the nineteenth century. The difference is that whereas at that time the primary role 
of the memory frenzy was to strengthen nationalist sentiments and patriotism, in our times 
the politics of regret has become the new grounds for legitimation. With the gradual decline 
of the nation state, legitimacy is no longer sought after in referring to heroic golden ages, but 
in remembering the criminal past. Olick’s perspective thus ‘places memory and regret 
properly at the center of its sociological account of modernity’.35 He contrasted this 
conception with the theory of Jürgen Habermas on post-conventional identities which regards 
modern identities as problematically constituted of particularistic (localised, nationalist) 
feelings and universalistic (transnational) values.
36
 Following this line of thought, suggested 
Olick, the recent wave of state apologies can be interpreted as a sign of the rise of 
universalistic principles of justice which are associated with more ‘mature’, post-
conventional identities. Finally, Pierre Nora claimed that ‘memory is constantly on our lips 
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because it no longer exists’.37 In his view, memory and the sacred have been expelled from 
society together with the nation as the foundation of identity, and the recent ‘memory boom’, 
upholding the traces of memory (lieux de mémoire) we have left, is thus a substitute for real, 
lived memories (milieux). 
It is important to note that, notwithstanding their very different approaches to the problem, 
all these accounts agree that the decline of the nation state or of nationalist sentiments is an 
essential condition for the emergence of the politics of regret. But is it not dangerous to base 
abstract explanations and grand historical narratives on this claim without actually examining 
its validity on empirical grounds? Is the assumption about the general decline of nationalism 
tenable? The politics of regret may very possibly emerge as a response to the rise of 
nationalist politics, not to their decline. Consider, for instance, the recent phenomenon of the 
‘pan-European politics of regret’. Following the practice of some of its member states, the 
European Parliament approved the 27
th
 of January as the European remembrance day of the 
Holocaust in 2005. Robert Jan van Pelt demonstrated that these national policies and the 
European measure were very likely aimed at counteracting the general rise of the far-right 
and of anti-Semitism.
38
 In this instance, memory politics arose because of the rise of 
nationalism, not because of its decline. 
Naturally, a single counter-example does not invalidate any of these historical sociological 
explanations that make sweeping generalisations about a number of cases. It should also be 
acknowledged that this approach is certainly an improvement over the transitology 
framework in some respects. Historical sociological accounts do not subscribe to the 
mechanical worldview of the comparative approach which assumes that all instances of 
political regret have the same underlying causal structure (the assumption of unit 
homogeneity). Furthermore, unlike transitology, the historical sociological approach pays due 
attention to the cultural aspects of political regret. I nevertheless consider both approaches 
governed by problem-solving thinking because they both produce the same type of 
objectifying knowledge that reifies social arrangements instead of challenging them. They try 
to explain a social phenomenon as if it was ‘out there’ to be observed and consequently 
ignore the role of the knowledge they produce in the perpetuation of this very phenomenon. 
The Moral Philosophical Approach 
Moral philosophical discussions about political regret usually aim to specify whether, why 
and how past atrocities should be commemorated, and by whom.
39
 The German ‘coming to 
terms’ with the Holocaust is arguably the most important empirical basis for any discussion 
                                                          
37
 Pierre Nora, ed, Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. I Conflicts and Divisions (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1. 
38
 Robert Jan van Pelt, ‘January 27, 1945 AD / 13 Shevat, 5705 AM. A Defining Moment in Modern European 
History?’ (presented at the Second Networking Meeting with Organizations Active in the Field of Memory and 
Remembrance, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012). 
39
 See, for example, Barkan and Karn, Taking Wrongs Seriously; Stanley Cohen, ‘State Crimes of Previous 
Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past’, Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1995): 7–
50; States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Dimitrijevic, 
Duty to Respond; Gesine Schwan, ‘Political Consequences of Silenced Guilt’, Constellations 5, no. 4 (1998): 
472–491; Smith, I Was Wrong. 
The Myth of the Politics of Regret 9 
 
about historical responsibility and has profoundly inspired moral arguments about political 
regret. Emmanuel Levinas viewed the Holocaust as ‘the greatest historical instantiation of 
bad conscience’40 and the ‘memory of injustice’41 has fundamentally changed the way people 
relate to each other. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, by establishing ‘the historical link 
between memories of the Holocaust and the emergence of a moral consensus about human 
rights’,42 argued that the scope of this effect on relations between people has in fact been 
global. They even remarked that the ‘Holocaust is now a concept that has been dislocated 
from space and time, resulting in its inscription into other acts of injustice and other traumatic 
national memories across the globe.’43 
It must not be forgotten, however, that the Holocaust is a very special case. The 
assumptions based on its de-contextualised conception are often untenable in other historical 
contexts and thus render the theories which rely on them exceptionally rigid and 
unresponsive. For this reason, Olick was right to point out that the moral philosophical 
discussion is often extremely abstract and ahistorical, rests on an assumption of ‘unilinear and 
teleological model of social and moral development’44 and refrains from cultural 
contextualisation in the fear that it would open the way for relativizing moral values. Far 
from embracing moral relativism, Olick essentially agreed with the values and the goals of 
the moral philosophy approach but took issue with the way it proposed to achieve these goals. 
True to their Kantian foundations, moral philosophical discussions of political regret hold 
that moral duties need to be honoured irrespective of historical conditions. In the spirit of the 
formula ‘ought implies can’, these approaches pay little attention to the limits of political 
action in particular historical contexts and to the wider social repercussions of the measures 
aimed at achieving the ends dictated by categorical imperatives. Based on Weber, Olick 
identified this logic with the ethic of conviction and thought that ethical discussions of 
political regret should instead follow the ethic of responsibility: become more practical and 
contextualised, and pay more attention to historical conditions of possibility. The two 
approaches essentially aim to achieve the same goals, but disagree sharply about the way 
these goals should be achieved. 
Even though the cure proposed by Olick is far from clear, the diagnosis he presented is 
accurate. Moral philosophical discussions of political regret are ideal theories in the sense 
that they try to specify how past atrocities should be commemorated in an abstract, idealised 
situation. Neglecting historical context and conditions of possibility, these accounts have a 
tendency to ‘depoliticise’ regret. It all begins with language. When referring to what I call the 
politics of regret, the traditional transitional justice conceptual framework prefers to use 
expressions such as ‘a society fulfils its duty to remember’ or ‘a nation honours the memory 
of the victims’. I have intentionally chosen the terminology used in this article to break with 
this apparently apolitical form of speech. By referring to all the approaches to past events as 
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‘politics’, I attempt to overcome the common practice of considering apology and the 
assumption of responsibility as morally desirable in all circumstances, while viewing all the 
other strategies as morally wanting and as results of dirty political meddling. I retain the 
concepts of politics of denial and politics of silence from this literature because I believe that 
these categories are extremely useful for analytical purposes. However, I am aware that 
employing them unreflectively and with their value-laden connotations is dangerous as that 
way oversimplified moral judgements (that apology is unequivocally good and denial and 
silence are unequivocally immoral) and untenable empirical claims (that apology is either 
apolitical or its underlying politics is irrelevant for moral considerations) would enter the 
analysis already at the level of concept formation. Naturally, the wording of categories has 
not become ‘neutral’ in any sense; rather, my conceptual framework simply conveys a 
different preconception, one which holds that political struggles and power games have an 
important part to play in the propagation of all of these strategies. 
Aspiring for apolitical regret on the social level is naive. In practice, the politics of 
memory and the ethics of memory ‘are interwoven, and they cannot – or at least should not – 
be separated’.45 Once the arguments of moral theories are used to evaluate specific cases, are 
invoked in political debates or are considered to be implemented in practice, they inevitably 
become politics rather than a purely moral theory. The moral philosophy approach should 
recognise and consciously evaluate the political dimension of its work. At the moment, 
however, moral theories of regret are only concerned with achieving morally desirable goals 
derived from abstract, idealised situations and do not take into account the potential political 
use and the likely social implications of their assumptions and arguments. This is not simply 
politically naive, but also irresponsible and politically dangerous. 
Moral philosophy accounts routinely take for granted that a (hypothetical or real) 
community exists within which commemoration does or should take place and that a 
historical narrative exists that the members of this community do or should commemorate. 
Essentializing these two things is problematic because neither of them are naturally occurring 
phenomena that exist ‘out there’; instead of being eternal and static over time, they are the 
fragile and ever-changing products of historical contingencies. By considering communities 
and their myths self-evident, moral philosophical accounts (intentionally or unintentionally) 
reinforce the very taken-for-granted social realities that the critical take on political regret 
should challenge. As Bell noted, the ‘existence of a “collective memory” should not be the 
starting point of investigation or ethical stipulation. Rather, in attempting to grapple with 
ethical questions about the uses of the past it is vital to analyze the dynamics of popular 
historical consciousness and the ways in which particular “collective memories” come to be 
formed and reproduced, the social and political roles they perform (whether intentionally or 
not), and the modes of inclusion and exclusion they sanction.’46 
To assume that a single, incontestable version of the past exists, ‘that there is a particular 
memory we must work towards, that that which must be remembered may be clearly 
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identified’47 is indeed highly exclusionary and can easily lead to dogmatism about past 
events. This argument can be used to treat transgressions from the official version of the past 
as taboo which represses rational debate and ultimately favours the preservation of existing 
structures of power. Even if the past could be sufficiently clearly specified, the ‘duty to 
remember’ and to ‘never forget’ is a contradiction in terms. ‘Forgetting is not simply the 
opposite of remembering. Remembering is structurally dependent on forgetting, is always 
marked by forgetting. This means that the idea of getting memory to conform more closely to 
“truth” is not only a narrow concern but one doomed to fail. Quite apart from the radical 
impossibility of “true” knowledge about the past, this simply ignores the inextricable 
relationship of remembering and forgetting’.48 Similarly to Maja Zehfuss, I maintain that the 
social response to grave historical injustices and mass crimes should not be a firmly believed 
and stubbornly defended ‘answer as to what constitutes appropriate memory’.49 In the case of 
the moral philosophy literature, this answer takes the form of an insistence on a single 
morally right reading of ‘the past’. I agree with Zehfuss that ‘[w]hen we have all available 
information but still know that we do not know we are most open to the need of an ethico-
political decision’.50 The role of the critical scholarly approach is essentially not the 
‘debunking’ or the reinforcement of one mythical narrative or another (activities that belong 
to the realm of giving answers), but the raising of questions, the refinement of concepts, and 
the education of the tools necessary for the critical evaluation of myths. Even if this attitude 
chooses not to take sides in the struggle between particular political myths (because it does 
not accept the exclusionary trait inherent in myths), the critical perspective is not a ‘point 
from nowhere’. It should learn from the shortcomings of moral philosophy and become 
situated knowledge: contextualised, consciously intervening in real political debates and 
aware of the likely social implications of its assumptions and arguments. 
The Critical Approach to the Politics of Regret 
As this short literature review has hopefully demonstrated, previous studies of the politics of 
regret have often been characterised by sweeping generalisations, problematic assumptions 
and doubtful methodological choices. More importantly, these approaches lack the critical 
perspective that challenges taken-for-granted assumptions and prevailing social 
arrangements, serves as a guide for human action, encourages self-reflection, and combats 
oppression, exclusion and discrimination.
51
 
Unlike the comparative and the historical sociological approaches, the aim of critical 
scholarship is not to explain the causes underlying the current preoccupation with political 
regret. The goal is not to explain but to change; what I mean by this Marxist-flavoured quip is 
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that attention should be drawn to the problematic discursive practices that determine how 
political regret, as well as other forms of political mythologies, are discussed and thought 
about. At the heart of the critical approach to the politics of regret is not a search for patterns, 
laws, or regularities ‘out there’ that need to be discovered, but an attempt to expose and 
challenge discriminatory cultural practices. 
Contrary to moral philosophical discussions, the critical position should not turn a blind 
eye to the exclusionary character of the politics of regret and present it as an unequivocally 
good, socially beneficial and morally superior approach to the past. Political regret should be 
properly understood as an element of the mythscape and its critical examination should be 
part of a broader scholarly enterprise that challenges the exclusionary character of 
mythologies.
52
 In the following, I will explain why a critical stance with respect to 
mythologies (including the politics of regret) is necessary and what form it should take. 
What is good and bad about political myths? Thinkers with an anthropological 
understanding of mythologies, like Harald Wydra,
53
 often hold that myths are a necessary 
condition for normal social life. Without them, social harmony and peace are not even 
conceivable. As shared images of the past and markers of certainty, they provide cohesion for 
a community and allow people to understand the world around them. The problem with this 
approach is that it appreciates mythologies too readily and rarely has the means of critique by 
which highly exclusionary and oppressive myths can be challenged.
54
 
Marxist accounts agree that myths are a cohesive force, but they argue that this cohesion is 
not in the interests of those who are bound together this way. They are misled and suffer from 
false consciousness as they internalise values and interests that are contrary to their own. 
Therefore, the social cohesion provided by myths is in fact coercive. The ultimate function of 
mythologies is then to enforce conformity to the demands of the ruling elite, and to mask and 
mystify the interests of those in power. The aim of this scholarship, exemplified by Eric 
Hobsbawm, is to expose the historical falsity of these ‘invented’ stories and thus produce 
enlightenment in the oppressed so that they can follow their true interests.
55
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Wary of the notion of objective truth, the critical attitude is not concerned with the 
historical accuracy of myths.
56
 It recognises that myths can help to consolidate a given social 
or group order but they are also important in challenging these. Myths are double-edged 
swords: they simultaneously bind with some people and alienate from others, legitimate an 
authority and undermine others, enable and constrain social action. Therefore, instead of 
asking whether any particular myth or myths in general are good or bad, true or false, we 
should try to determine how narratives that all claim to have exclusive right to the discursive 
space can best be accommodated in the least discriminatory way. 
Bell outlined the backbone of an ethical framework that simultaneously acknowledges and 
challenges all myths. He claimed that all myths deserve to be acknowledged at a public level 
in the sense that their content and historical accuracy should not be a basis for their exclusion 
or suppression. The task of the state is thus not to project a certain version of the past that 
legitimates prevailing institutions and perpetuates a ‘peaceful social order’, but to establish 
the institutional possibilities for a space where myths can openly confront each other on a 
level playground. This ethics of myth does not single out any particular myth for criticism 
(not even the governing one) but encourages a critical attitude towards all exclusionary 
narratives. While it is not clear how the state can act as a benevolent guardian over the 
mythscape, this vision contains a very important insight: individuals are not necessarily 
products and captives of mythologies, but, to some extent, are also capable of critically 
evaluating and challenging them. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the state 
retreats from the mythscape and refrains from favouring certain narratives while 
marginalising others. The exclusionary tendencies of mythologies, however, could be 
successfully tamed if individuals were more aware of the uncertainty and the complexity of 
the past and were better equipped with the tools necessary to take a more critical stance 
towards simplified narratives.
57
 
Bearing in mind all of the above, the responsibility of the critical scholar is to support the 
acknowledgement of the right to existence of all interpretations of the past and at the same 
time promote the necessity of a critical stance towards myths by raising awareness of their 
exclusionary characteristics. In this vein, the vocation of the critical historian is to stress ‘the 
contingency, opacity, and plurality of the past’ and to be ‘self-reflective, aware of the 
partiality, weak foundations, fallibility of their enterprise, as opposed to the intrinsic 
simplicity and univocality of mythology’.58 In order to arrive at what Said called a ‘non-
coercive and non-dominating knowledge’,59 no ‘voice’ should be given absolute priority 
(either in a positive, affirming or negative, dismissive way). The critical scholarly attitude 
thus does not uphold or challenge any particular myth based on its content or historical 
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accuracy, but leads a comprehensive intellectual attack on the exclusionary traits of mythical 
thinking in general. 
If we consider political regret as a form of mythical thinking, we might be able to see it as 
part of a mythscape where identity-constitutive narratives (that are sometimes boastful and 
self-congratulatory, sometimes regretful and self-flagellatory) are pitted against each other 
but ultimately follow the same discriminatory logic. The politics of regret may be replacing 
stories of national glory as the basis of legitimacy, but it definitely follows the very same 
exclusionary logic that makes national myths incompatible with liberal democratic 
principles.
60
 This implies that political regret should neither be considered a coping strategy 
superior to others, nor singled out for criticism. The scholarly attention to it should form part 
of a more general challenge to the wholeness of the underlying discursive frameworks which 
enable and constrain discussion about political regret and other forms of political 
mythologies. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I argued for the importance of thinking about the politics of regret critically, 
within academia and beyond. I explained what the responsibility of the critical scholar is with 
respect to political regret and how it should be viewed in a broader social environment. My 
argument rested on the empirical assumption that actual cases of the politics of regret are 
mostly mythical and for this reason they should be considered to be part of the totality of 
myths, the mythscape. The critical approach to political regret is thus part of a broader 
scholarly enterprise that emphasises the necessity to recognise myths as myths and not to 
regard them as the apolitical, taken-for-granted stories they claim to be; it argues for the need 
to be aware of the potentially problematic elements and consequences of mythical thinking 
and for the importance of critical self-reflection in this light. 
Similarly to Zehfuss, I maintain that the ethico-political solution to dramatic historical 
experiences is not simply about more information about past events or ‘knowing our past 
better’ (note the reference to the past in the singular again); these common responses to the 
‘memory crisis’ are important but in themselves insufficient measures to address difficult 
conceptual and normative questions about the representation of historical events. Some issues 
cannot be settled with the addition of historical detail but can only be approached with an 
open mind if we ‘know that we do not know’. 
This essay attempted to militate against the exclusionary features of mythical thinking, 
against its insistence on one particular reading of past events and its tendency to present itself 
as natural, neutral, consensual, commonsensical. If we accept that the politics of regret is in 
fact mythical, the assumption that it is a morally superior and socially more beneficial coping 
strategy than other forms of memory politics becomes questionable. But it also means that the 
politics of regret should be properly understood as a voice in the mythscape; consequently, 
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criticising only the politics of regret indirectly reinforces the legitimacy of other mythologies 
and other forms of memory politics. In order to avoid this bias, the critical scholarly attitude 
outlined in this article places the study of the politics of regret at the centre of a general 
critique of political mythologies. 
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